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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER TO CONTROL PRICES, RENTS, WAGES, AND SALARIES:
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 1970
The proposition that the federal government is one of enumerated powers
is firmly established and requires no substantiation. The United States Con-
stitution clearly and expressly so provides in the tenth amendment.' Therefore,
every act of Congress must find its root in a provision of the Constitution. A
discussion of the extent of the powers upon which control of prices, rents, wages,
and salaries could be founded is beyond the scope of this article. However, brief
comment concerning the legislative power is in order. The congressional power
to legislate in the areas encompassed by the Economic Stabilization Act of
19702 could be based on the commerce clause or the war power.8 The com-
merce power is broadly construed by the United States Supreme Court to allow
Congress to regulate any interstate activity or any activity which affects inter-
state commerce. 4 Likewise, the war power is extensive. Under this power, the
Court has sustained price controls, 5 rent controls, 6 prohibition,7 conscription,8
and racial exclusion.9 A review of the cases cited indicates that if Congress
had directly controlled prices, rents, wages, and salaries, rather than delegating
the power to do so to the President, the action would be sustained. Therefore,
for the purpose of this article, the power of Congress to control prices, rents,
wages, and salaries is assumed.
Economic control of some form has long been a factor in the United States, 10
1 U.S. Const. Amend. X. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Consti-
tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
2 Pub. L. No. 91-379, Aug. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 799; as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-558, 84
Stat. 1468; Pub. L. No. 92-8, 85 Stat. 13; Pub. L. No. 92-15, 85 Stat. 38; 12 U.S.C. § 1904
note.
3 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. The necessary and proper clause provides, "To make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers ......
The necessary and proper clause might be included here; but, as shown by its language,
it is not a basic power and, therefore, its operation must be founded on another power
granted in the Constitution.
4 See United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948) ; Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942) ; United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby
Lumber, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) ; Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1938) ; National Labor Rela-
tions Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
5 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
6 Wood v. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); and Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503
(1944).
7 J. W. Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U.S. 264 (1919).
8 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
) Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) ; and Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
10 Safety-Appliance Act of 1893, 45 U.S.C. § 1; Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914,
15 U.S.C. § 41; Tariff Act of 1922, 19 U.S.C. § 154; Radio Act of 1927, 47 U.S.C. § 89. The
Adamson Act of 1916 fixed a permanent eight-hour standard working day for employees en-
gaged in the operation of trains upon interstate railroad carriers and temporarily regulated
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but not until the National Industrial Recovery Act'1 did Congress pass legisla-
tion which directly invaded the economic life of virtually every American. Even
this Act did not directly control wages and prices 12 as is currently occurring
under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970. There have only been two prior
periods of time in which wage and price maximums have been imposed--during
World War II and the Korean War. It is the purpose of this article to explore
the current vitality of the non-delegation doctrine as an attack upon the con-
stitutionality of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 and to offer suggestions
for curtailing the arbitrary exercise of administrative power.
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-HISTORY
No one could seriously contend-as long as sanity prevails, that is-that
delegation of functions and powers vested in Congress should not be allowed
within certain limits. If Congress were required to personally exercise all the
functions of one major administrative agency-Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, National Labor Relations Board, Civil Aeronautics Board, Federal Com-
munications Commission, or Securities and Exchange Commission-it would
have time for no other activity. Clearly, administrative agencies are necessary
and will continue to be an integral part of our governmental system. If such
agencies are to exist and to serve a useful purpose, Congress must be able to
delegate a portion of its power to these agencies. The real question, and one
still to be resolved, is what efective methods of control and limitation of power
can be developed which, while allowing the agencies to perform their functions,
prevent them from usurping the legislative, executive, or judicial powers of
our federal government.
The separation of powers doctrine is implied from the first three articles
of the United States Constitution which establish the three coordinate branches
of the federal government. The separation of powers doctrine and article I of
the Constitution13 are the mortar and brick from which the non-delegation
doctrine is constructed. In order to fully understand the current vitality of the
prohibition on delegation of legislative power by Congress to the executive
branch of the federal government, a historical review is necessary.
A. Pre-Panama Refining and Schechter
The earliest case dealing with delegation was The Brig Aurora v. United
States.' 4 Congress had delegated to the President the power to reinstate sections
the wages of such employees. See Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917) ; and Powell, The Su.
preme Court and the Adamson Law, 65 U. Pa. L. Rev. 607 (1917).
11 Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 15 U.S.C. § 703.
12 See Schechter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) where the live poultry code fixed
hours per workday, maximum number of hours per week, and provided for a minimum rate
of pay of 50 cents per hour.
13 U.S. Coast. Art. I, § 1. "All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives."
14 7 Cranch 382 (1813).
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of a previously expired act if he should declare by proclamation that either
Great Britain or France had ceased violating the neutral commerce of the
United States. On the question of whether the provisions of the act were revived
by President Madison's proclamation, the Court said curtly, "we can see no
sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion in re-
viving the act of March 1st, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their
judgment should direct."' 5
Seventy-nine years after The Brig Aurora, in Field v. Clark,16 a tariff act
17
was attacked by importers as an unconstitutional delegation to the President of
the power to lay taxes and duties.' 8 In this case the Court, for the first time,
considered the delegation of legislative power in detail. The act was sustained
(1) by relying on the decision in The Brig Aurora and three state court cases, 19
(2) by considering prior delegations by Congress, and (3) by interpreting the
act such that "[i]t does not, in any real sense, invest the President with the
power of legislation. '20 In Field, Mr. Justice Harlan stated unequivocally "[t]hat
Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle uni-
versally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the Constitution."'21 The Court declared that "he may
deem" in the statute meant that the President shall "ascertain the fact" whether
the commercial regulations of other countries were "reciprocally equal and rea-
sonable." The Court felt that "[1]egislative power was exercised when Congress
declared that the suspension should take effect upon a named contingency. What
the President was required to do was simply in execution of the act of Con-
gress."
22
In Buttfield v. Stranahan,23 the Court sustained the Tea Inspection Act of
15 Id. at 388.
16 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
17 Act of October 1, 1890, ch. 1244, 26 Stat. 567.
Is U.S. Const. Art. I, § 1, supra n.13. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8. "The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. ."
19 Cincinnati, Wilmington &c. Railroad v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 88 (1852). ("The
true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily in-
volves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the
latter no valid objection can be made.") ; Moers v. City of Reading, 21 Penn. St. 188 (1853)
("Half the statutes on our books are in the alternative, depending on the discretion of some
person or persons to whom is confided the duty of determining whether the proper occasion
exists for executing them. But it cannot be said that the exercise of such discretion is the
making of the law.") ; and Locke's Appeal, 72 Penn. St. 491 (1873) ("The legislature can-
not delegate its power to make a law; but it can make a law to delegate a power to deter-
mine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own
action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many
things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the
law-making power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determination outside
of the halls of legislation.")
20 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 693.
23 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
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189724 which made it unlawful to import tea "which is inferior in purity, qual-
ity, and fitness for consumption." The Act directed the Secretary of the Treasury
to appoint a board of tea experts to submit to him standard tea samples. The
Secretary was to establish standards of purity, quality, and fitness for consump-
tion based on the recommendations of the board. Suit was brought against the
collector of the port of New York by an importer whose tea was seized and
destroyed under the Act. The Court rejected the contention that the Secretary
was vested with legislative power saying:
Congress legislated on the subject as far as was reasonably practicable,
and from the necessities of the case was compelled to leave to executive
officials the duty of bringing about the result pointed out by the statute.
To deny the power of Congress to delegate such a duty would, in effect,
amount but to declaring that the plenary power vested in Congress to
regulate foreign commerce could not be efficaciously exerted.
2 5
This case clearly shows the realization on the part of the Court that effective
government requires delegation. The germ of the later idea that delegation will
be sustained where there is a congressionally established standard is indicated
by the first sentence of the above quotation.
Mr. Justice Lamar broke with the "ascertainment of fact" test of Field and
The Brig Aurora in United States v. Grimaud.26 Congress had authorized the
Secretary of Agriculture to protect public forests and forest reservations from
destruction and to regulate their use to this end. The Court unanimously upheld
the delegation on the theory that the Secretary was not legislating when he
promulgated regulations, but that he was acting as a congressional agent given
the "power to fill up the details." Although put differently, the Court here, as
was expressed in Buttfield, stated the idea that Congress had made the basic
decisions and had only delegated the administrative task of implementing them.
The Court at this point in time was still harboring the notion that Congress was
doing the legislating and that the executive official was merely following their
directive. This was obviously not so. The power to pass regulations which are
enforced by sanctions is the power to make law and, therefore, is legislation.
In J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,2 7 a new theory for sustain-
ing delegations was born. The controversy involved the flexible tariff provision
of the Tariff Act of 1922.28 The President, after an investigation by the United
States Tariff Commission, could adjust import tariffs within 50 percent of rates
specified by the Act. The purpose was to equalize the cost of production of
goods in foreign countries with that of the United States. Chief Justice Taft
reaffirmed the validity of the separation of powers doctrine, but felt that some
24 Act of March 2, 1897, ch. 358, 29 Stat. 604.
25 192 U.S. 470, 496 (1904).
26 220 U.S. 506 (1911).
27 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
28 Act of September 21, 1922, ch. 356, 42 Stat. 858.
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delegation to the executive branch "within defined limits" was necessary. He
went on to establish a new word formula for sustaining legislative delegations:
If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legis-
lative power. 29 (Emphasis added.)
Here again the idea that Congress has done the legislating and that the admin-
istrator is only carrying out their directive is present. The intelligible principle
test was short lived. In 1935 the Supreme Court took unprecedented action in
two cases (discussed below) by holding provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act of 193330 unconstitutional and thus for the first time establishing
a limit on delegation of legislative power.
B. Panama Refining and Schechter
The economic depression which began in the fall of 1929 had produced a
national crisis of untold proportions by 1933. To facilitate economic recovery,
the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed. The first test of this delega-
tion came in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan.31 The Court found section 9(c) of
the Act to be an unconstitutional delegation. This section allowed the President
to prohibit the transportation in interstate and foreign commerce of "hot oil"--
petroleum products produced or removed from storage in excess of any state
statute or regulation. A violation of any rule or regulation promulgated under
the Act was punishable by fine, imprisonment, or both. This delegation was, in
fact, no more extensive than some sustained in prior cases. In Hampton, for
example, the President was granted discretionary power to increase or decrease
tariffs by 50 percent. The discretionary power to increase or decrease tariffs is
no greater than the discretionary power to prohibit or not to prohibit the trans-
portation of "hot oil."
Panama Refining represents a discontinuity in what had been a uniform
trend of gradually expanding discretion vested in administrative officials and
agencies. Had the Court felt so disposed, limitations on the discretionary power
granted the President could have been found as is shown by the dissent of
Mr. Justice Cardozo. 32 While the dissent was viewing only the delegation at
hand, the majority looked beyond it and saw no limitation on the powers which
could be delegated in the future if section 9 (c) were sustained. This conclusion
is derived from the Court's statement:
While the present controversy relates to a delegation to the President,
the basic question has a much wider application. If the Congress can
make a grant of legislative authority of the sort attempted by § 9 (c),
29 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
30 Supra n.11.
31 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
32 Justice Cardozo agreed standards were necessary but found (1) the President was
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we find nothing in the Constitution which restricts the Congress to the
selection of the President as grantee. The Congress may vest the power
in the officer of its choice or in a board or commission such as it may
select or create for the purpose. Nor, with respect to such a delegation,
is the question concerned merely with the transportation of oil, or of oil
produced in excess of what the State may allow. If legislative power
may thus be vested in the President, or other grantee, as to that excess
of production, we see no reason to doubt that it may similarly be vested
with respect to the transportation of oil without reference to the State's
requirements. That reference simply defines the subject of the prohibi-
tion which the President is authorized to enact, or not to enact, as he
pleases. And if that legislative power may be given to the President or
other grantee, it would seem to follow that such power may similarly
be conferred with respect to the transportation of other commodities
in interstate commerce with or without reference to state action, thus
giving to the grantee of the power the determination of what is a wise
policy as to that transportation, and authority to permit or prohibit it,
as the person, or board or commission, so chosen, may think desirable.
In that view, there would appear to be no ground for denying a similar
prerogative of delegation with respect to other subjects of legislation.33
The most extensive delegation of legislative power in our history was struck
down in Schechter v. United StatesY4 This case involved section 3 of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act which granted the President authority to approve
"codes of fair competition" submitted by trade groups or to promulgate such
codes on his own initiative. Violation of the codes was made a misdemeanor.
Before approving the codes, the President was required to find that the group
submitting the code "imposed no inequitable restrictions on admission to mem-
bership," that the group was "truly representative," and that the codes were not
intended to foster monopolies. The Court considered these requirements, the
broad policy statement in section 1 of the Act, and the lack of precedent in prior
cases for such extensive delegation in declaring it unconstitutional. The Court's
decision was summarized as follows:
In view of the scope of that broad declaration [section 1], and of the
nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the discretion of the
President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws
for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is
virtually unfettered.
We think that the code-making authority thus conferred is an un-
constitutional delegation of legislative power. 35
Although the Court still speaks of a requirement of standards in order to sustain
delegations, Panama Refining and Schechter are the only two cases invalidating
congressional delegations to the executive branch of the government.3 6
limited to oil in excess of state regulations, (2) the means of regulation was specified, and
(3) policies were announced in § 1 of the Act.
33 293 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1935).
34 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
35 Id. at 541-42.
36 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). A congressional delegation to coal
producers and workers was invalidated.
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C. Post-Panama Refining and Schechter
The extent to which the Court will go in finding standards upon which to
sustain a delegation is exemplified in the recent case, Arizona v. California."
Arizona, California, and other southwestern states were engaged in a contro-
versy over how the water of the Colorado River and its tributaries should be
divided. The governors of the various states involved met in Denver in 1925
and 1927 and fashioned an apportionment of the water, but California and
Arizona rejected the proposal. This proposal, the Colorado River Compact, 5
apportioned the water between the upper and lower basins of the Colorado River
but did not make an apportionment between the various states. Three bills,
introduced in Congress attempting to resolve the problem, were defeated. The
fourth bill, which passed, became the Boulder Canyon Project Act.3 9 The Act
granted the Secretary of the Interior extensive powers to apportion the water
among the various users by authorizing the Secretary to contract for delivery
of water and by providing that no party could receive water without such a
contract. The majority noted that Congress had "set out in order the purposes
for which the Secretary must use the dam and the reservoir." The Act had
provided:
First, for river regulation, improvement of navigation, and flood
control; second, for irrigation and domestic uses and satisfaction of
present perfected rights in pursuance of Article VIII of said Colorado
River compact; and third, for power.
40
Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting, felt that "Congress made a gift to the Secre-
tary of almost 1,500,000 acre-feet of water a year, to allocate virtually as he
pleases in the event of any shortage preventing the fulfillment of all of his de-
livery commitments. ' 41 He went on to say:
The principle that authority granted by the legislature must be limited
by adequate standards serves two primary functions vital to preserving
the separation of powers required by the Constitution. First, it insures
that the fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not
by an appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the
people. Second, it prevents judicial review from becoming merely an
exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against
which to judge the official action that has been challenged.
42
Although some might disagree with the primary function standards are
to serve, Mr. Justice Harlan's disagreement with the majority is well founded.
Certainly such broad statements as "river regulation" or "improvement of navi-
gation" do not provide any real guidelines within which the Secretary must
37 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Other cases on point are collected and discussed in 1 Davis,
Administrative Law Treatise §§ 2.03-2.05 (1958).
38 70 Cong. Rec. 324 (1928).
s9 43 U.S.C.A. § 617 et seq.
40 373 U.S. 546, 585 (1963).
41 Id. at 626.
42 Id.
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exercise his discretion, nor do they provide a basis for judicial review of any
challenged action. Some authors have argued in favor of more meaningful
standards, 43 while others argue in favor of discretion.44 Kenneth C. Davis ac-
curately and succinctly summarized the current vitality of the non-delegation
doctrine when he said:
The non-delegation doctrine is almost a complete failure. It has
not prevented the delegation of legislative power. Nor has it accom-
plished its later purpose of assuring that delegated power will be guided
by meaningful standards. More importantly, it has failed to provide
needed protection against unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary
power. The time has come for the courts to acknowledge that the non-
delegation doctrine is unsatisfactory and to invent better ways to pro-
tect against arbitrary administrative power.
4 5
DELEGATION OF POWER TO CONTROL PRICES,
RENTS, WAGES, AND SALARIES
Initially, Congress passed the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 which
provided for the control of prices and rents. This Act was amended by the
Inflation Control Act of 1942 which allowed control of wages and salaries.46
This delegation was attacked in Yakus v. United States47 as an unconstitutional
delegation to the Price Administrator of legislative power. The petitioners were
convicted of selling beef at prices above the established maximums. The Court
sustained the delegation by finding adequate standards in section 2(a) of the
Emergency Price Control Act and section 1 of the amendatory Inflation Control
Act. The Court found that the Acts marked the "boundaries of the field of
the Administrator's permissible action" by providing that (1) prices were to be
fixed to effectuate the policy of the Acts, (2) prices were to be "fair and equit-
able," (3) "due consideration, so far as practicable," was to be given to pre-
vailing prices during the designated base period, and (4) adjustments were to
43 Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard For The Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 Neb. L.
Rev. 469 (1968) says that standards (1) provide guidance for administrators in the applica-
tion of statutes, (2) provide safeguards against unwarranted enlargement of legislative
grants, (3) focus attention upon the public objectives of statutes, (4) limit the extension of
discretion, (5) improves legislative draftsmanship, (6) that observation of standards im-
pels exploration by the agencies as to the existence or absence of conditions justifying pro-
posed action, and (7) they are required for effective judicial review of administrative action.
Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need For Better Definition of Standards,
75 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 867 (1961-62) argues: "A prime source of justified dissatisfaction with
the type of federal administrative action which I will shortly specify is the failure to develop
standards sufficiently definite that decisions will be fairly predictable and that the reasons
for them will be understood; this failure can and must be remedied."
44 Wade, Anglo-American Administrative Law: Some Reflections, 81 L.Q. Rev. 357
(1965).
45 Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. Chi. L. Rev. 713 (1969).
46 Act of January 30, 1942, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23, 50 U.S.C. Appx. Supp. II §§ 901 et seq;
as amended by the Inflation Control Act, ch. 578, 56 Stat. 765, 50 U.S.C. Appx. Supp. 11
§§ 961 et seq (1942).
47 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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be made to compensate for factors affecting prices.48 The rent control provisions
of the Acts were sustained on the same day as the Yakus decision in Bowles v.
Willingham.
49
The Defense Production Act of 195050 was the second instance of general
price, rent, wage, and salary control. There are no significant cases deciding the
constitutionality of the delegation involved. The only United States Supreme
Court case did not reach the delegation issue, 51 and lower federal court opinions
declaring the delegation constitutional did not give reasons for their decisions. 52
However, taking cognizance of prior decisions upholding the 1942 controls and
the similarity between the two Acts, there is little doubt that the delegation in
the 1950 Act would have been found valid had the Supreme Court considered
the question.
August 15, 1971, President Nixon by Executive Order No. 1161553 imposed
a freeze on prices, rents, wages, and salaries. The authority for this action was
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970.5 4 Eight days after the freeze was im-
posed, the first action was filed attacking the Act as an unconstitutional delega-
tion of legislative power.5 5 Two actions were filed shortly thereafter,56 but only
in Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America, AFL-
CIO v. Connally57 has the constitutionality of the delegation been decided by a
three-judge court. In refusing to grant an injunction against the enforcement
of the Executive Order, the court found the Act to be a constitutional delegation
containing adequate standards. As indicated throughout this article, the courts
invariably find standards in all delegations; therefore, a review of the standards
found in the Meat Cutters opinion will be of no value. Instead, the actual word-
ing of the Economic Stabilizaton Act of 1970 is compared with the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942, as amended, in tabular form in the appendix. The
1942 Act was chosen over the Defense Production Act of 1950 because the 1942
Act was found by the United States Supreme Court to be a constitutional delega-
48 Id. at 423.
49 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
50 Act of September 8, 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798; as amended, ch. 275, 65 Stat. 131,
ch. 530, 66 Stat. 296, ch. 171, 67 Stat. 129, 50 U.S.C. App. (1946 ed. Supp. V) § 2061 et seq.
51 Allen v. Grand Cent. Aircraft Co., 347 U.S. 535 (1954).
52 United States v. Huler Abattoirs, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 536 (E. D. Mich. 1952); Oak
Mfg. Co. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 514 (N.D. Ill. 1961). See also United States v. Eric.
son, 102 F. Supp. 376 (D. Minn. 1951) ; appeal dismissed 205 F.2d 420 (8th Cir. 1951) which
held federal price regulation did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution.
53 36 Fed. Reg. 15727 (1971).
54 Supra n.2.
55 Zuckman v. United States, Civil Action No. 1696-71 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 23, 1971).
56 Other actions filed include: Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of
North America, AFL-CIO v. Connally, Civil Action No. 1833-71 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 10, 1971) ;
and National Education Association of the United States v. Cost of Living Council, (D.D.C.,
filed Sept. 24, 1971).
57 Civil Action No. 1833-71 (D.D.C., filed Sept. 10, 1971). Reported in BNA Federal
Controls, Basic Texts, at 2:1315.
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tion and because of the similarity of wording between the 1942 and 1950 Acts.
The table in the appendix shows that the substantive provisions of the 1942
and 1970 Acts, though worded somewhat differently, convey the same meaning
when the 1970 Act is considered in conjunction with the implementing Execu-
tive Order No. 11615. 58 The primary difference is that the 1942 Act contains
extensive procedural provisions while the 1970 Act contains none. This should
not prove fatal to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 because section 203
provides, "The President may delegate the performance of any function under
this title to such officers, departments, and agencies of the United States as he
may deem appropriate." Executive Order No. 11615 establishes the Cost of
Living Council "which shall act as an agency of the United States." The Admin-
istrative Procedure Act defines agency broadly as "each authority of the Govern-
ment of the United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review by
another agency." 59 This definition surely includes the Cost of Living Council
and may include the President."0 Therefore, through the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act, procedural provisions are incorporated into the 1970 Act reducing
the dissimilarity between it and the 1942 Act. If the 1970 Act is considered by
the Supreme Court, it will be found to be a constitutional delegation because of
the similarity with the 1942 Act which was held to be constitutional.
THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH
By the first three articles and by article I, section 1, the framers of the
Constitution did not mean to completely prevent congressional delegation. This
conclusion flows from two facts:
(1) Considered unnecessary was Madison's motion at the Constitu-
tional Convention that the President be given authority "to exe-
cute such other powers ... as may from time to time be delegated
by the national Legislature."1
6'
(2) Numerous delegations were made by the first Congress which was
composed predominantly of constitutional framers.
6 2
58 Supra n.53.
59 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (1).
60 Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Synthesis, 78 Yale LJ. 965, 997 (1969);
Davis, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 823 (1966); Jaffe,
The Right to Judicial Review, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 401, 769, 778, 781 (1958). Congress and the
courts are expressly excluded from the definition of agency, thus fortifying the conclusion
that the President is included in the definition.
61 1 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 67 (1911).
62 The First Congress, without standards, delegated to the courts the power "to make
and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting of business in the said courts,
provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States" (Judiciary Act of
1789, c. 20, § 17, 1 Stat. 73, 83) ; to district courts the power to impose "whipping, not ex-
ceeding thirty stripes" (Id. at 77) ; to the President the power to provide for military pen-
sions "under such regulations as the President ... may direct" (Act of Sept. 29, 1789, c. 24,
§ 1, 1 Stat. 95) ; and to the President the power to fix the pay for military personnel wounded
in the line of duty (Act of April 30, 1790, c. 10, § 11, 1 Stat. 119, 121).
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The courts have constructed the non-delegation doctrine block by block while
at the same time continuing to allow delegation. It is a hollow, foundationless
doctrine enshrouded in meaningless word formulas. It is time that the courts
expressly recognize this in their opinions and replace the threadbare doctrine
with new cloth capable of protecting the citizen from arbitrary and capricious
discretionary action by administrative officials and agencies.
Today there are really only three possible limits on the exercise of un-
bridled discretionary power:
(1) The exercise of administrative power requires enabling legisla-
tion; therefore, Congress is free to limit or remove authority.
(2) Internal controls can be imposed by the administrative agency it-
self.
(3) Constitutional limitations are imposed by the Bill of Rights.
Congress, by careful initial draftsmanship of its enabling legislation and frequent
evaluation of the actions of administrative officials or agencies, can effectively
limit arbitrary discretion. Also, Congress could impose additional procedural
safeguards by strengthening and broadening the scope of the Administrative
Procedure Act.63 However, from the nearly unlimited discretionary power his-
torically granted by the legislature-and unfortunately sustained by the Court-
it is apparent that this route will not prevent arbitrariness in administrative law.
Likewise, the administrative agencies have not acted to contain their arbitrary
exercise of power. 64 Of the three possible limitations, only those derived from
the Bill of Rights appear to offer a plausible basis for future expanded protec-
tion.
Kent v. Dulles65 is an example of a constitutional limitation. The Secretary
of State, pursuant to an act of Congress, denied passports to petitioners because
of their alleged communistic beliefs and their refusal to file affidavits concerning
Communist party membership. The Court struck down the regulation under
which the passports were denied because the right to travel is part of "liberty"
and a citizen cannot be deprived of his liberty without due process of law under
the fifth amendment. The fifth amendment is an ideal vehicle for transporting
the individual outside the zone of arbitrary discretion of administrative officials
and agencies. Through broader interpretation of the due process clause, greater
procedural safeguards could be required in agency action, and increased judicial
review could be provided. Hopefully, the courts will proceed further in the
application of the Bill of Rights to reduce the zone of arbitrary discretion of
administrative officials and agencies.
63 Supra n.5 9, §§ 551-559.
64 Friendly, The Federal Administrative Agencies: The Need For Better Definition of
Standards, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 867 (1961-62)."- 65 357 U.S. 116 (1958). But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
CONCLUSION
Based on past decisions of the United States Supreme Court, the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970 is not an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power. Standards at least as substantive as those accepted by the Court in the
past are present in this Act. However, the requirement of standards first ex-
pressed in the Panama Refining and Schechter cases must be recognized for what
it is-a flowing liquid capable of assuming the shape of any container and offer-
ing no resistance to the legislative will when Congress seeks to pour it into a
new receptacle. It is time that the Court stop dangling the carrot of standards
before prospective challengers of legislative delegations and offer true protection





















The purposes stated in § 1 (a) are
so extensive that almost any action
could be found to be included within
them.
The termination provisions, other
than the date, are surplus. Congress
can always terminate the act; and
the President, having discretion to
issue "such orders and regulations as
he may deem appropriate," (§ 202-
(a)) can effectively terminate the
Act. This was also true of the Price
Administrator under the 1942 Act.
§ 205 § 205 allows an agency of the
United States to bring an action "in
the proper district court of the
United States or the proper United
States court of any territory or other
place subject to the jurisdiction of
the United States. .. "
§ 1 § 202 (a) & The President is "directed" by the
(b) Inflation Control Act to issue a gen-
eral stabilization order. However, he
has discretion in making adjust-
ments; therefore, the result is the
same as is achieved by § 202(a) &
(b) of the 1970 Act.
Ex.O. There is no requirement of a
§ 3 (c) "statement of considerations involved
in the issuance of such regulation or
order" in the 1970 Act.
Slightly greater discretion has







§ 201 & 202
Administration and
Delegation






the 1970 Act than was possible un-
der the 1942 Act.
§ 202 (a) & No declaration is required by the
(b) 1970 Act. The 1942 Act seems, on
its face, to be more restrictive in al-
lowing rent control; but the defini-
tion of "defense-rental area" given
by the Act (§ 302(d)) makes the
apparent restriction illusory.
§ 3 Ex.O. § 1(c) excludes agricultural
products, thereby preventing chal-
lenge on this point.
§ 4 & 5 § 202 (a) & The 1942 Act expressly allows con-
(b) tract impairment; whereas, the 1970
Act does not. Therefore, impairment
of current contracts may violate the
due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment; but judging from prior deci-






Administrative procedure is pro-
vided for by Ex.O. §§ 2-6. Delegation
is provided for by § 203 of the 1970
Act.
No procedural provisions are in-
cluded in the 1970 Act; however, the
Administrative Procedure Act ap-
pears to apply.
§ 204 & 205
The inclusion of definitions in the
1970 Act would have reduced ambi-
guity and, thereby, reduced the dis-
cretion granted. However, terms are
often undefined in statutes, leaving
to the courts the determination of
their meaning. Therefore, the lack of
definitions would not appear to be
fatal to the 1970 Act.
* The table in this appendix has been organized around the Emergency Price Control
Act of 1942. Less relevant provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act and the Inflation
Control Act of 1942 have been omitted for the sake of brevity. Also omitted are amendatory
provisions of the Inflation Control Act. When a reference is to Executive Order No. 11615,
the short form Ex.O. and the Executive Order section number are used.
